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PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN THE
SKILLED BUILDING TRADES: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE
PHILADELPHIA PLAN
Earl M. LeikenThe conflict over jobs for minorities in the skilled building trades'
was perhaps the most turbulent racial clash of the last half of 1969.
Several urban centers were the scenes of ugly racial confrontations.
Coalitions of civil rights groups picketed construction sites and dosed
down work completely in a number of cities, 2 while white union members in Chicago and Pittsburgh resorted to mass counter-demonstrations
that led to mob violence. 3 Although the search for solutions has now
shifted from the streets to city hall negotiation rooms, there is reason
to believe that the battles of 1969 will be refought unless a meaningful
4
program for integration of the building trades is achieved.
In the construction industry, civil rights pressure and industry
resistance have created an "irresistible force-immovable object" syndrome that inevitably leads to explosions. Blacks are desirous of obtaining construction jobs for a number of reasons. 5 A large percentage
of major construction work is done in the center of cities. Since building trade work is more visible to blacks than work in other industries,
-t Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. A.B. 1964, LL.B. 1967,
Harvard University.
I The terms "skilled building trades," "construction industry," and "construction"
are used interchangeably throughout this article. The term "industry" refers to employment areas other than the construction industry.
2 Civil rights groups forced work stoppages on construction in the following cities
in 1969: Buffalo, N.Y. (N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1969, at 43, col. 1); Cambridge, Mass. (id.,
Dec. 12, 1969, at 1, col. 5); Chicago, Ill. (id., Sept. 23, 1969, at 56, col. 3); Pittsburgh, Pa.
(id., Aug. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 1); Seattle, Wash. (Central Contractors Ass'n v. Local 46,
IBEW, 312 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Wash. 1969)).
3 N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1969, at 18, col. 3; id., Aug. 28, 1969, at 27, col. 6.
4 Thus far, the pattern for construction industry conflicts appears to be cyclical. Widespread demonstrations and major confrontations over the same issues occurred in 1963.
The 1963 confrontations in New York, Philadelphia, and Cleveland are described in
F. MARsHALL & V. Bsuccs, THE NEGRO AND APPRENTICESHIP 51-66, 88-92, 103-04 (1967).
There were also demonstrations and shutdowns in Elizabeth, Patterson, Newark, Detroit,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C. Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination
in Apprenticeship, in NEGROES AND JoBs 298, 314-16 (1968). It was the failure of solutions
in the intervening period which caused the problem to re-emerge last year with much
greater hostility and more damaging consequences than had occurred before.
5 For a full discussion of the reasons for strong black feeling about jobs in construction, see Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 4, at 313.
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they feel more strongly here than elsewhere that they are entitled to a
"piece of the action." The high percentage of public funds supporting
construction offers the possibility for political pressure. Thousands of
blacks have operated for years on the edge of the high-paid, skilled
building trades as non-union electricians, plumbers, or the like, and
on construction sites as common laborers. In terms of present job skills,
it would be a small step for many blacks to move into the building trade
union skill areas, but it would mean a significant advance in pay.
Finally, the educational deficiencies that plague blacks and minority
group members elsewhere offer no real barriers to their obtaining jobs
in construction.
At the same time, special obstacles to achievement of jobs for
minorities are present in the construction industry which do not operate elsewhere. The major problem lies in union control of industry
hiring policies." When contractors seek employees for particular jobs,
they are required by their collective bargaining agreements to contact
the union business agents who refer new workers to them. The unions
are primarily interested in protecting the job security of their own
membership rather than in meeting the manpower needs of the industry. Thus, at the very time that blacks are seeking new job openings,
unions are following a deliberate program of "planned scarcity" in the
supply of workers.7 Rather than sending new men to fill vacancies, the
8
unions prefer to create overtime opportunities for existing members;
when there are openings they are often passed only to sons and relatives
of those already working. 9 This policy has resulted in a "critical shortage" of skilled construction manpower in all sections of the country,
with predicted estimates of shortages as high as two million by 1975.10
6 For thorough discussions of the special difficulties which the hiring-hall system

poses to the achievement of equal employment in the construction industry, see F.
COUSENS, PUBLIC CIVIL RIGHTS AGENCIES AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT 64-69 (1969);

Marshall,

Racial Practices of Unions, in NEGRoES AND Joas 277 (1968); Sanders, James Haughton
Wants 500,000 More Jobs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 80-31, 122-33.
7 F. CousENs, supra note 6, at 67.
8 M. LEFKOE, THE CRISIS IN CONSTRUCTION 12 (1970).
9 Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 4, at 318-19.
10 M. LFKoE, supra note 8, at 5. In Lefkoe's comprehensive study of the labor problems

in construction, he indicates that this figure is a conservative one. In a recent study
commissioned by the industry, the union-produced scarcity of workers was found to be
the major cause of the industry's problems, including extremely high wage settlements,
continual work stoppages, and excessive overtime wage payments. Id. at 3-17.
Richard C. Van Dusen, Undersecretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, has asserted that instead of the 40,000 persons currently completing apprenticeships each year, at least 140,000 a year will be needed between now and 1975. Wall St.
J., Sept. 26, 1969, at 22, col. 1.
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The apprenticeship program to prepare new workers for the industry
is theoretically operated by unions and management jointly, but it is,
in reality, dominated by the unions. 1 Selection committees for apprenticeship favor relatives and often operate with considerable racial
prejudice. 12 The rules set by unions for apprenticeship entrance are
stringent, excluding those beyond their early twenties, although many
slightly older blacks have significant experience in these areas and are
fully capable of learning and performing construction jobs effectively. 13
Despite the ostensible control of personnel policies by unions, employers bear much of the responsibility for the segregated status of the
skilled building trades. It is their acceptance of the union scheme and
full cooperation with it that has been a sine qua non of the existing
situation.
Because of these special barriers, black pressures have thus far
produced almost negligible results. Statistics recently released by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission show that blacks hold
only 1.4 percent of the positions in the skilled mechanical trades, 14
while they make up 11.1 percent of the national population 15 and
11 F.

MARSHALL & V. BRIGGS, supra note 4, at 14.
12 Although minimum requirements are published and ostensibly reviewed according to a standard procedure, these decisions are made on a highly subjective basis,
particularly with respect to age and education requirements. Biased attitudes
toward Negroes, candidly expressed by contractors and union officials, can and
do affect chances of admission to training and is [sic] undoubtedly the crucial
factor in the continuation of white dominance in this industry.
F. CoUsENs, supra note 6, at 67.
18 Hain, Black Workers Versus White Unions: Alternate Strategies in the Construction
Industry, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 37, 41 (1970).
14 EEOC Release No. 70-15, at 2 (May 19, 1970) (table). The statistics in this report
show minority membership in various unions. Since almost all contractors in this industry
have union shop agreements, the numbers of blacks who are union members is tantamount
to the number who work in the trade. See Statement of William 11. Brown III, Chairman,
EEOC, in EEOC Release No. 69-44, at 1 (1969).
The breakdown on black percentages in the skilled mechanical trades is as follows:

Trade
Boilermakers
Electrical Workers
Elevator Constructors
Iron Workers
Plumbers
Sheet Metal Workers

Percentage of Blacks
3.9%
1.9
0.7
1.9
0.6
0.3

EEOC Release No. 70-15, supra. Blacks also are only 1.8% of the carpenters and 2.5% of
the operating engineers. Id.
15 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATIsTICAL ABSTRATr OF THE UNrrED STATES: 1969, at

23 (1970). Sanders mentions a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics study which states that if
blacks held construction jobs in proportion to their percentage of the population, there
would be 87,000 more black carpenters, 97,000 more mechanics, 82,000 more metal craftsmen, and 112,000 more construction foremen. Sanders, supra note 6, at 130.
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constitute twenty percent of those in the central cities16 where-most
construction occurs. Although a large number of blacks work as con8
struction laborers, 17 these jobs are less well-paid and less desirable,
and black entrance into this area may be attributable to increasing
white disinterest in the available jobs. In an effort to make a breakthrough for minorities in the skilled building trades, the Labor Department produced its highly controversial revised Philadelphia Plan,
which requires efforts to hire certain percentages of blacks and other
minority group members on federal or federally-assisted construction
projects. The Plan has been through several bitter battles and one neardisastrous attack in Congress,'9 but it survives, has been extended, and
has become the major tool of the current administration in attacking
20
building trade discrimination.
I
BACKGROUND OF THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN

The Philadelphia Plan operates under Executive Order No.
11246.21 Section 202 of the Order requires the inclusion in government
16 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T or CoMMaRcE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
OF NEGROES IN THE UNIrm STATES 10 (1967).

17 EEOC Release No. 70-15, supra note 14, at 3 (table). Blacks are 29.2% of all general
laborers. A fair percentage work in the "trowel trades." For instance, blacks constitute
13.3% of plasterers and 10.0% of bricklayers. Id. at 2-3 (table). However, the percentage
in these trades is still disproportionate to the black percentage of the population in the
central cities.
18 For instance, the average hourly rate with fringe benefits for laborers in the United
States on April 1, 1970, was $4.92. The average rate for electricians was $7.16 and for
plumbers was $7.51. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Release on Union
Wage Payments of Building Trade Workers 2 (May 7,1970).
19 See 115 CONG. REc. S 17624-36 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969). A rider proposed in Congress
to a supplemental Labor Department appropriations bill would have required a cut-off
of federal funds on any contract operated under the Plan. The rider passed in the Senate
but was defeated in the House. As a result of strong White House appeals, the Senate
reversed its position and passed the bill without the rider. 72 BNA LAB. REL. REP.-Nws
& BACKGROUND INFORMATION 489 (Dec. 29, 1969).
20 For a discussion of the problems of preferential treatment in education, housing,
employment, and areas other than the construction industry, see Askin, The Case for
Compensatory Treatment, 24 RUTGERs L. REv. 65 (1970); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an
Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L.
R v. 363 (1966); Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification
by Race, 67 Micar. L. Rev. 1553 (1969).
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) has called
for preferential treatment in the employment and training of blacks to meet the critical
needs of ghetto residents. REPORT OF TmE NATIONAL ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON CIvIL DisORDERs 413-24 (Bantam ed. 1968).
21 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Comp.), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 320
(1967 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. IV, 1969).
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contracts and federally-assisted construction contracts of a clause committing the contractor and major subcontractors to nondiscrimination
in employment and "affirmative action" to ensure that applicants are
employed and employees treated without regard to race, creed, sex,
color, or national origin. 22 The Labor Department's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance (OFCC) is responsible for coordinating and
supervising the efforts of federal agencies to secure compliance with
23
the clause.
The affirmative action requirement was added to a predecessor
executive order in 196124 because of the frustration of attempts to
achieve equal employment through a pure nondiscrimination requirement. Committees studying the previous program noted that it was
25
ineffective because it simply led to passive neutrality by employers.
Evidence indicates that the affirmative action clause was initially interpreted to require a broadening of the government contractor's recruiting efforts through more intensive advertising and publicity in
minority areas.20 The program has come to require preferential treat22 The Order applies to government construction contracts and to government supply
contracts.
23 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1 to -1.47 (1970). Each federal agency administering contracts or
administering federal aid for construction has full-time equal employment officers who
enforce the clause. Pre-award reviews of equal employment deficiencies are conducted for
low bidders on these contracts. Where the contractor or subcontractor has more than 50
employees and the contract involves more than $50,000, the contractor is required to present an affirmative action plan to remedy his equal employment deficiencies. The plan
must be approved before the contract will be finally awarded. The agencies make periodic
checks to determine whether there is compliance with the plan. Failure to comply can
lead to suspension or cancellation of the contract or debarment of the contractor from
future federal contracts. Compliance responsibilities for each major industrial and supply
contractor are assigned to the agency with which the company does most of its government
business. In construction, the responsible agency on each contract is the one for which a
facility is being built or which is administering the federal aid. The entire operation is
coordinated and supervised by the OFCC.
24 Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-63 Comp.).
The first executive order requiring equal employment practices by government contractors was promulgated by President Roosevelt in 1941. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R.
957 (1938-43 Comp.). A succession of orders followed, but none required anything more
than nondiscrimination until 1961.
25 COMMITrEE ON GOvERNmrr CONTRACTS, PATTERN FOR PRoGIEss: FINAL REPORT TO

PREsmENr EIsNHowmt 14 (1960). The Committee reported that it was not so much "overt

discrimination" as "the indifference of employers to establishing a positive policy of
nondiscrimination [that] hinders qualified applicants and employees from being hired
and promoted on the basis of equality." Id. (emphasis in original). See also S U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RiGHTs, REPORT 76 (1961).
26 See Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government
Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 590, 593-96 (1969). This note carefully describes the early attempts to administer Executive Order No. 10925 in industry and points out that the
emphasis was on advertising and a broadened recruitment base.
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ment in hiring as a result of an evolution in efforts to achieve effective
27
implementation of the Order in the construction industry.
The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity,
the predecessor of the OFCC, had severe difficulties in enforcing the
Order in construction, largely because of the special problems created
by union control over personnel. 2 To meet these problems, the Committee sent a large task force into the field between June and October
of 1964 in an effort to explain the Order's operation in construction
and to secure compliance. This effort failed to promote any positive
results and achieved little more than the'gathering of a great deal of
information. 29 In 1965, the OFCC set up an area coordinator program
in several major construction centers to help coordinate agency efforts.
This program met with only limited success except in areas where a
predecessor of the Philadelphia Plan was adopted. 30
The seeds for the present Philadelphia Plan were planted in the
Cleveland operating area in 1967. In a city that had been afflicted by
numerous construction shut-downs, OFCC Area Coordinator Charles
Doneghy, OFCC Director Edward Sylvester, and others in the Labor
Department developed a solution that became formalized as the Cleveland Plan.31 This approach went far beyond the "affirmative action"
requirement of broadening one's recruitment base through more
publicity and recruiting in minority areas. It required government and
federally-assisted construction contractors to "assure minority group
27 To the present time, the program has generally been more successful in creating
jobs for minority groups on industries other than the construction industry. Interview with
Charles Doneghy, Cleveland Area Coordinator, OFCC, in Cleveland, Ohio, July 1, 1970. For
general discussions of some of the successes of the program in industry and its lack of
accomplishment in construction, see R. NATHAN, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 86-149 (1969); M.
SovERN, LEGAL REsTRAINTS ON RACIAL DMCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 103-42 (1966). In
the evolution of affirmative action under the program, some of the more extreme solutions
applied to solve difficult problems in construction have later been applied in a modified,
toned-down form to other industries. Thus, the present requirement that all major contractors submit manning tables specifying their equal employment goals, set forth in the
OFCC regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.40 (1970), was initially a part of the Cleveland Plan
for attacking construction industry discrimination in that city. See R. NATHAN, supra at
109.
The Philadelphia Plan's requirement of attempts to hire "ranges" of minorities has
been toned down and applied to new industry regulations (sometimes referred to as Order
No. 4), 35 Fed. Reg. 2586 (1970), that require "result-oriented procedures," with "goals and
time-tables ... to increase the utilization of minorities at all levels and in all segments
of the contractor's work force where deficiencies exist." Id. at 2587.
28 M. Sovr.N, supra note 27, at 137-38; THE PRESIDENT'S COMS!m. ON EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 120 (1963).
29 M. SovRNu, supra note 27, at 138.
S0 R, NATHAN, suPra note 27, at 108-12.

31 Id. at 109.
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representation in all trades and in all phases of the work" on such
contracts. 32 It also required low bidders on government contracts to
submit manning tables indicating the numbers of minority group members that would be hired in various phases of the job.88 Contractors
were informally notified at pre-award conferences that they were to
have roughly twenty percent minority group participation on each
project in the skilled trades, although precise numbers were determined
on a case-by-case basis.34 If the contractor did not presently have enough
minority group members working for him and could not obtain them
from the union, he was to go out and find sufficient numbers to
satisfy his goal-a policy of preferential treatment to correct past deficiencies. This program was highly successful in Cleveland 5 and was later
extended to Philadelphia.8 6
In 1968, the Comptroller General was asked to rule on the program as implemented in Philadelphia. He held that it was inconsistent
with proper bidding requirements on federal contracts because it failed
to explicitly inform contractors of the nature of the requirements before bidding.37 In the summer of 1969, the Labor Department announced a new Philadelphia Plan8s which was partially designed to
meet the Comptroller General's objections but which was primarily
intended to make a major breakthrough in securing jobs for minority
groups in skilled construction trades.
82 Id.
88 Id.

84 Interview with Charles Doneghy, supra note 27.
85 R. NATHm, supra note 27, at 109 8:n.32, citing V. Macaluso, Survey of Minority

Group Participation Under the Cleveland Operational Plan for Construction Compliance
with Executive Order 11246 (memorandum dated Nov. 15, 1967). This memorandum shows
that Cleveland contractors had committed themselves to hiring 110 minority group crafts-

men in the mechanical trades and as operating engineers out of 475 federal construction
jobs available in 1967. There were virtually no blacks in these trades prior to 1967 in
Cleveland.
88 Probably because of this program's controversial preferential treatment aspect,
Secretary of Labor Wirtz initially drew back from any thought of extending it beyond these
two cities:

In at least two cases-in Cleveland and in Philadelphia-the Government contract
situation had gotten so bad, with antagonism and recrimination piled on top of
each other... that there was probably no effective alternative to that kind of
ruling. But it isn't right as a general policy and it won't work. Even if it drags
someone who worships his prejudices into line, it demeans somebody else who
has done the right thing for the right reason.
Address by W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, Before the Convention of Building and
Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, Nov. 29, 1967, at 4, quoted in R. NATHAN,
supra note 27, at 110-11.
37 47 CoMP. GEN. 666 (1968).
88 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Revised Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity Requirements of Executive Order 11246 for Federally-Involved Construction (June 27, 1969).
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Under this approach, contractors and building trade unions in
major construction cities are strongly encouraged to develop "hometown solutions" by instituting their own programs to bring sizeable
numbers from minorities into the trades. 39 If these programs fail to
show potential for significant progress, the government makes the
award of contracts contingent on the promise of contractors and major
subcontractors to make a "good faith effort" to hire certain governmentestablished percentages of minority workers on federal or federallyassisted projects. The percentages required will increase each year over
the next several years. The ranges for each trade in an area are established by a study of several factors: the extent of minority group participation in the trade, the availability of skilled minority manpower,
the need for training programs, and the impact on the existing labor
40
force.
In the absence of satisfactory "home-town solutions," the Plan was
initially implemented in Philadelphian and is now being extended to
Washington, D.C.4 2 The Comptroller General, in a new opinion, noted
that the revised Plan met his prior objection by giving contractors full
information on what they would be required to do in advance of their
bidding. He nevertheless held that Plan illegal because it violated the
nondiscrimination provisions of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act 43 by requiring contractors to hire on the basis of race.44 The Attorney General has ruled that the Plan is legal, 45 and it has withstood
its first court test.46 The Cleveland Plan, which also requires hiring on
the basis of race, has been held lawful by the Ohio Supreme Court, and
the United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 47 The Plan's
43
legality and propriety, however, remain a matter of hot controversy.
89 Speech by George Schultz, Secretary of Labor, Before the National Association of
Homebuilders, in Houston, Texas, Jan. 19, 1970, condensed in 73 BNA LAB. REL. REP.
NEWS & BACKGROUND INFORMATION 87 (Jan. 26, 1970).
40 U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 38, at 7-9.
41 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Establishment of Ranges for the Implementation of the Re-

vised Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity Requirements of Executive Order 11246 for Federally-Involved Construction (Sept. 23, 1969).
42 74 BNA LAB. REL. REP.-NEws & BACKGROUND INFORMATION 101 (June 8, 1970).
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
44 48 CoMP. GEN. 59, 68-71 (1969).
45 42 Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 37 (1969).
46 Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
47 Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E2d 907
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
48 Senator Sam Ervin has attacked the Philadelphia Plan for its imposition of illegal
quotas and for its excessive burdens on contractors. BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAC.-SUMDEvELopmENTs No. 140, at 4 (July 2, 1970).
MARY OF LAT
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II
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The major policy argument in favor of the Plan is that it offers
some hope of success where nearly everything else has failed. The
earlier version of the Plan achieved some substantial gains in Cleveland.49 Its threatened application to other cities has already induced
"home-town agreements" that are far more comprehensive than anything previously achieved. 0
It is clear that a vague affirmative action obligation has been
49 Note 35 supra.
50 The Labor Department has warned 19 cities to adopt home-town solutions or face
the imposition of a Philadelphia Plan. 73 BNA LAB. REL. REP-NEws & BACKGROUND INFORMATION 141 (Feb. 16, 1970).
Boston: The Boston plan commits contractors to attempt to hire 2,000 minority group
tradesmen and to provide them with continuing job opportunities for a five-year period.
74 id. at 165-66 (June 29, 1970).
Chicago: In a city where the Labor Department estimates that the population is onethird black and where fewer than three percent of skilled building trade jobs are held
by blacks, the city's building trade unions and black civil rights groups signed a pact for
a home-town solution that promises to involve 4,000 Negroes in the trades immediately.
The pact was signed under pressure of possible government implementation of the Philadelphia Plan in the Chicago area. It includes an agreement to hire 1,000 qualified blacks
in journeymen positions immediately and to place 3,000 more blacks in apprenticeship
programs. The plan has been approved by the Labor Department and calls for establishment of neighborhood centers partially funded by the federal government to recruit blacks
and other minorities. Id. at 39 (May 18, 1970).
Denver: This plan calls for the hiring of 400 minority group craftsmen within the first
18 months and an additional 1,050 thereafter, many of whom are to be Spanish-surnamed
Americans. Id. at 166 (June 29, 1970).
Indianapolis: A plan has been adopted in this city to give immediate employment,
union membership, and apprenticeship opportunities to large numbers of qualified blacks
referred by the Minority Coalition of Indianapolis. A panel whose members are to include
the Secretary of Labor has been appointed to review this plan. BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRA.-SuMMARy OF LA=Fsr DEvELOPMENTS No. 136, at I (May 7, 1970).
New York: A New York plan has been adopted by the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Council and the New York Building and Construction Industry Board
of Urban Affairs. It provides on-the-job training for minorities with periods of instruction,
counselling, and remedial education at a central training facility. However, probably
because of its lack of definite standards and commitments, the Labor Department has so
far refused to fund it and has not approved it as an acceptable alternative to the Philadelphia Plan. Some state funds have been committed to the plan. 73 BNA LAB. REL. RE.NEWs & BACKGROUND INFORMATION 279 (April 6, 1970).

Pittsburgh: The Black Construction Coalition and the city's construction industry
agreed upon a plan to put approximately 1,200 blacks in skilled jobs in the building
trades in the next few years; the agreement probably ends the threat of a federally-imposed
solution such as the Philadelphia Plan in Pittsburgh. An office is to be opened to recruit
qualified blacks, and a number of them are expected to become journeymen immediately.
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1970, at 50, col. 3.
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largely unworkable in an industry where the obstacles to equal employment are as entrenched as they are in construction. A recent study
of the federal contractor program prepared by the Brookings Institution for the United States Commission on Civil Rights indicates that
contractors tend to "get by" a vaguely-defined affirmative action requirement without doing much of anything to change their hiring
practices. 51 It is difficult for compliance officials to dispute their claims
of satisfaction of their obligations without some specific standards like
those of the Philadelphia Plan to measure results. 52 Because of the
referral hiring arrangement of the building trades, it appears essential
that contractors be required to hire specific numbers of blacks if any
results are to be achieved at all. Otherwise, a contractor can argue that
he meets his equal employment obligations by simply not discriminating among those people referred to him by the union, and that the
union is likely to refer only whites. It is only the belief of the contractor that he must hire a certain number of minority group members
which forces him to pressure the union into referring blacks or into
going outside the union to meet his goal.
A somewhat troubling argument can be made that it is inappropriate for the federal government to enforce hiring on the basis of
race. Preferential treatment is opposed to a basic precept of our society
which requires that each man be dealt with on his merit as an individual rather than on the basis of the color of his skin. To give a preference to one man because he is black is as wrong as preferring another
because he is white; the appropriate approach is to require a policy of
racial neutrality and to go no further.53
Unfortunately, a nondiscrimination approach in construction,
even if it could be effectively implemented, would be only a small step
toward curing the damage of long years of exclusion. At the very best,
a policy requiring nondiscrimination would lead to blacks receiving
a percentage of new openings on federal contracts proportionate to
their percentage of the population-roughly eleven to twenty percent
in urban areas. Beyond this, it would do nothing to affect the total
composition of the work force, and blacks would continue to constitute
a small minority in the skilled trades for perhaps a generation. Many
of those who have been wrongfully excluded in the past would continue
to be denied jobs in the future. Under the Philadelphia Plan, a higher
51 R. NATHAN, supra note 27, at 136-38.
52 Id.
53 See generally Kaplan, supra note 20.
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percentage (about fifty percent)54 of new openings on federal jobs must
go to minority group members if contractors are to meet their ranges.
Thus, within the next few years, the Plan will place a minority percentage on the total work force which is closely proportionate to the
minority percentage of the population, and therefore remedy the past
wrongs much more rapidly.
In fact, a policy of pure nondiscrimination is probably unworkable in construction. The contractor, as previously indicated, can satisfy his own nondiscrimination requirement by hiring only whites
if that is all the union refers to him. A federal contractor program
requiring nondiscrimination only by the contractor would be likely
to achieve nothing at all. It is also improbable that racial attitudes
in the industry can be changed to ones of neutrality. By background,
custom, and habit, contractors and unions in construction think and
act in terms of race despite the words of the law. Instead of attempting to change behavior by using a nebulous goal of racial neutrality,
it is more realistic to seek a change in results through measurable objective standards. As contractors and unions deal with more blacks
under the Plan, it is reasonable to hope that they will come to accept
their participation in the industry and that a change in behavior and
attitudes will eventually occur as a long-term result. 55
It can be argued that a preferential system destroys individual
treatment of workers on the basis of merit and that whites who would
otherwise be hired because of superior skills will lose opportunities
because of the program's emphasis on racial hiring. It does not appear,
however, that hiring occurs on the basis of merit under the present
system. Because of union control over personnel, workers receive jobs
primarily through family relation, contacts, and seniority."u Since
whites already have these advantages, the Plan should do far more
to equalize black opportunity for jobs than to deprive whites of a fair
chance. Furthermore, in light of the severe manpower shortages in the
construction industry, the program should not result in the exclusion
54 As applied to Philadelphia, the Plan anticipates that approximately one out of
every two new openings will have to go to minority workers if contractors are to meet
their ranges. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 41, at 14.
55 ET]he phenomenon I am discussing is known as cognitive dissonance, a strain
between behavior and attitude, a tendency to ameliorate this tension by bringing
the two into conformity, which may be done by rationalizing an enforced behavior of nondiscrimination. In this resolution, law is an important element for
there is a strong tendency to obey and emulate authoritative models and to accept
a fait accompli. A number of investigations have tended to bear out this judgment.
P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JusricE 40 (1969).
56 See Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 4, at 313.
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of many capable whites.57 If the unions respond properly, by expanding
job opportunity to meet the true needs of the industry, there should
be enough room for qualified whites even though the contractor meets
his range for minorities.
A further objection to the Plan has been that it is directed against
the wrong party; i.e., contractors rather than unions. Under the hiringhall arrangement, it is the latter who are primarily responsible for the
discriminatory personnel policies that exist in the industry, and the
contractor is a victim of the union's wrongs if he fails to get a contract
because of his inability to comply with the program. This argument
has merit, not for purposes of making contractors immune from responsibility but for calling attention to the need for more direct regulation
of unions through the contractor program. Under the present approach, the provisions covering unions are very modest; they essentially
require the contractor to inform the union of his equal employment
responsibilities. 8 Major subcontractors for supplies and services, however, have specific affirmative action goals and percentages to meet.59
There is no reason why the unions should not be treated as what they
actually are in construction: subcontractors for purposes of supplying
personnel. In this way, the unions could be regulated as subcontractors
and the difficulties at the very heart of the problem could be attacked
more directly.
The contractor, however, is culpable for cooperating with the
existing union programs and should not be free from regulation.
Despite the large economic power of unions in this industry, it is clear
that contractors could have achieved a great deal by opposing raciallydiscriminatory union policies and insisting that blacks be referred to
them. It is common practice under the National Labor Relations and
Railway Labor Acts to hold an employer derivatively responsible for
cooperating with the union's unfair treatment of those it is supposed
57 Note 10 supra. Since the system is based on percentages, the absolute number of
blacks required will go up as more whites are hired. Nevertheless, given the shortages in
the industry, it ought to be possible for contractors to meet their percentages and still hire
all qualified whites. Moreover, the percentages apply only to manpower hours on federal
construction work-not to the contractor's total work force.
If the present business slide turns into a major recession, construction will be cut
back and the projections of the manpower needs of the industry will not be accurate.
Nevertheless, there are sufficient policy arguments to justify the Plan even in the unlikely
event that there are no manpower shortages in the industry and the Plan does lead to the
exclusion of large numbers of whites.
58 41 C.F.R. § 1-12.805-3 (1970).
59 Id. § 1-12.805-4.
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to represent. 60 There is every reason to apply the same policies here.
Furthermore, even within its present limits the program attacks union
discrimination. If the unions fail to refer enough blacks to contractors
in an area, that area will simply lose the federal construction contract.
The unions will be faced with the alternatives of referring some blacks
or seeing all of their men lose the opportunity to work on a federal
construction job. Simple economics dictates that they are more likely
to select the former alternative, modify their own practices, and refer
minority workers.
It can be argued that other means exist to attack discrimination
in the building trades and that action through other channels is more
palatable than preferential treatment. One alternative is Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act 61 which allows direct actions against discrimination by labor unions as well as contractors. 62 Title VII should
certainly be used in conjunction with the federal contractor program.
However, Title VII has a number of drawbacks as a device for curing
the problem by itself. It is enforced in two ways-by individual complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and by
discretionary suits brought by the Attorney General. 63 Individual complaints are not a completely effective weapon. If the EEOC fails to
negotiate a solution, the individual must bring suit himself, and there
is no guarantee that his legal expenses will be reimbursed; this limitation acts as a major deterrent to individual suits.64 The Attorney General functions through the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division
which is kept busy with suits in a number of other areas, such as schools
and housing. Moreover, Title VII operates on a case-by-case, union-byunion basis; it involves all the delays incidental to a judicial procedure
-complaint-filing, trials, appeals, and the like. It is entirely punitive
and it only takes effect after a violation has occurred. With one or two
major federal construction contracts, the Philadelphia Plan can do
more in a month to bring blacks into the skilled building trades than
Title VII can do in several years. The Plan deals with all of the construction trades in a city at once, it offers the "carrot" of federal money,
and promises of compliance must be immediate or the contract simply
will not be awarded.
60 Richardson v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Central of Ga. Ry.
v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956); Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
61 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
62 Id. § 2000e-2.
63 Id. § 2000e-6.
64 See M. Sovan, supra note 27, at 73-80.
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An approach advocated by the building trade unions is the AFLCIO's "Apprenticeship Outreach,"6 5 which is partially funded by the
Labor Department and is designed to bring more minority group
members into building trade apprenticeships. The program is useful.
However, it does not have an element of government coercion, and it
emphasizes progress through the slow apprenticeship route under which
it can take three to five years to give a black full status and pay as a
journeyman. Even under the most optimistic predictions, the program
is not expected to have a significant impact for several years. 68 Moreover, progress in "Apprenticeship Outreach" has been considerably
stimulated by the development of the Philadelphia Plan, as unions in
various areas seek to present a home-town solution to avoid the ap67
plication of the Plan in their areas.
The Labor Department's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training
has equal employment regulations that apply to all registered apprenticeship programs.6 8 However, the penalty for noncompliance is deregistration. Since registration confers no tangible benefits, this penalty
is equivalent to nothing more than a slap on the wrist.6 9 The program's
effectiveness is limited further because the Bureau is run primarily
by former building trade union officials who are more sympathetic to
70
unions than to equal employment.
The Plan has another important advantage. Despite its rather radical
approach to the problem, it has broad support among moderate, conservative, and liberal elements of the political spectrum. The Plan is
consistent with the conservative credo that every man in society should
be given a chance to work. Moreover, it has been proposed and implemented by a Republican Administration. At the same time, liberals
generally applaud the Plan for its potential impact in creating jobs
for the underemployed and underprivileged. 71 The only groups vehemently opposed to the Plan are the contractors and the building trade
unions, but preferential employment of blacks could lead to their being
accepted in the construction industry and thus to beneficial changes in
65 73 BNA LAB. RL. REP.-NEws & BACKGROUND INFORMATION 36 (Jan. 19, 1970).
66 Statement of William H. Brown III, supra note 14, at 3.
67 See note 50 supra.
68 29 C.F.R. §§ 30.1-.16 (1970).
69 The loss of registration status to unions and employers operating joint apprenticeship programs would constitute little more than a loss in prestige. Cf. M. SovEu, supra
note 27, at 177-97.
70 Sanders, supra note 6, at 130. State and local equal employment agencies have been
similarly unsuccessful in attacking construction industry discrimination. See F. CousENs,
supra note 6, at 69.
'71 See 71 BNA LAB. REL. REP-.NEws &BACKGROUND INFORMATION 537 (Aug. 25, 1969).
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attitudes3 2 Therefore, unless one takes an absolute position against
preferential treatment, the Philadelphia Plan of federal contractor
compliance seems uniquely qualified from a policy point of view to
meet the problem of achieving equal employment opportunity in the
construction industry.
III
LEGALITY OF THE PLAN

A. Constitutional Considerations
An argument can be made that the Plan violates the equal protection rights of white citizens by establishing a preferred hiring classification for blacks and other minorities. The responses to such an
argument depend upon the extent to which the due process clause of
the fifth amendment incorporates the equal protection requirements
of the fourteenth amendment and makes them applicable to the federal
government.
In Bolling v. Sharpe,73 the Supreme Court indicated that equal
protection and due process are not necessarily coextensive, but recognized that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process." 74 It observed further that when a racial classification
is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, the
result is a deprivation of due process.7 5 It is arguable that where, as in
the Philadelphia Plan, the government utilizes a justifiable racial dassification to promote the proper objective of equal employment opportunity for racial minorities, no violation of the fifth amendment's due
process clause results.
If the equal protection requirements of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments are coextensive, 76 the response to the contention that the
Plan denies whites equal protection is more complex. Normally, when
the Supreme Court reviews an economic regulation that establishes
77
classifications of citizens, it pays considerable deference to the law.
It requires only that the classification be for a reasonable and permissible purpose (e.g., for the public welfare), that the classification
72 See note 55 supra.
73 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
74 Id. at 499 (footnote omitted).
75 Id. at 500.
76 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 517 n.10 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
77 Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065,
1087 (1969).
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be relevant to the purpose of the law, and that it include "all persons
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law."78 1
As an economic regulation affecting the federal government's contracting program, the Philadelphia Plan meets all of these tests. Its
purpose is to create equal job opportunities for minorities who have
been the victims of discrimination-a goal clearly in the public interest.
Moreover, the classification is clearly relevant, and it includes all those
similarly situated with respect to its purpose since it is carefully designed to include all minorities who have suffered past discrimination
70
in construction.
However, the Plan establishes a racial classification, one that is
highly suspect under the fourteenth amendment and thus reviewed by
the Court with more "rigid scrutiny" than that indicated above.8 0 The
Court has indicated that a racial classification is permissible when there
is an overriding social justification for it."' To establish such justification, it is necessary to show that the law's objective could not be obtained through non-racial classifications and that the rule meets a
rigid balancing test in which the public interest considerably outweighs
any detriments to affected private parties.82
A constitutional test of the Plan would be clearly distinguishable
from cases in which the Court treats racial classifications as highly
suspect. Instead of tending to impede the purpose of the fourteenth
78 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAmiF. L. Rxv. 341, 346
(1949). See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
79 The Plan includes blacks, American Indians, Spanish-surnamed Americans, and

Orientals. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 38, App., at 3.
So Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192

(1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
81 The Court adopted such a position in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), when it held that special wartime legislation requiring removal of Japanese and

Japanese-Americans from the West Coast was justified on the basis of an overriding need
for national security. The Court observed that "[pressing public necessity may sometimes
justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can." Id. at 216 (emphasis added).

This view has apparently been confirmed in two more recent decisions, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), where the
Court invalidated antimiscegenation and anti-interracial cohabitation statutes, noting
that the requisite showing of overriding justification was absent. In McLaughlin the Court

stated:
Our inquiry ... is whether there dearly appears in the relevant materials
some overriding statutory purpose requiring the proscription of the specified
conduct when engaged in by a white person and a Negro, but not otherwise.
Without such justification the racial classification contained in [the statute] is
reduced to an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 192.
82 Comment, supra note 77, at 1103.
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amendment, it can be argued that the Philadelphia Plan is designed
to further that purpose by remedying the effects of a long history of
discrimination against minority groups and by creating conditions of
equality for them. The Court's fear of racial classifications has been
that they act "invidiously" to discriminate against minorities; the
reason for such concern does not exist when the classifications act in
a "benign" manner to restore equal treatment. Thus, the Court might
choose to review the Philadelphia Plan with its benign quota system
under the normal review criteria for non-racial classifications; 83 the
Plan would clearly pass such a test.
If the Court, however, were to subject the Plan to "rigid scrutiny"
as a racial classification, it appears that it would satisfy even the more
stringent requirements. First, a racial classification is necessary here
because it is the only practical way to define a group that has been
victimized by discrimination in the past. Second, the benefits likely
to be conferred on minorities will considerably outweigh any damage
that might occur if a small number of whites are denied job opportunities because of the Plan's operation. The great benefits to minorities are obvious. The detriments to whites are speculative, and if they
do occur at all, they are likely to affect only small numbers of job
applicants.
While the racial classification system of the Philadelphia Plan does
not make the Plan unconstitutional, it is possible to argue the opposite
-that the Plan is required, or at least strongly supported, by the
Constitution. The government would be constitutionally forbidden to
give a federal or federally-assisted construction contract to a contractor
who discriminates in his employment practices. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,"4 the Supreme Court prohibited state involvement with or support of a discriminatory operation. Burton calls for
"sifting facts and weighing circumstances"85s to determine whether there
is sufficient government activity to invoke its doctrine. In that case,
sufficient involvement was found in the variety of mutual benefits
conferred when a private restaurant leased space inside a state building
from the state parking authority. At least as much and probably more
government activity exists in employment on federal construction work
done with federal money. If the government contracted with a raciallyexclusive employer, it would be doing the very thing condemned by
83 See id.at 1107.
84 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
85 Id. at 722.
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Burton-placingits "power, property and prestige behind the discrimination." 6
A federal district court has resolved the precise issue by applying
Burton to enjoin a state from making a construction contract with a
discriminating employer;8 7 the court's reasoning could be applied to
the federal government as well. 8 Thus, the Plan serves to protect the
government from violating its constitutional duty to refrain from financing contractors who would use federal money to engage in employment discrimination.
The Philadelphia Plan, however, does more than require present
nondiscrimination. It also attempts to remedy the effects of prior
discrimination by requiring that minorities receive special consideration in future hiring. In the context of federal construction, it is clear
that the wrong the government is attempting to remedy is not the
contractor's alone. To some extent, the government is seeking to remedy
its own past failures in awarding contracts to discriminatory employers
without requiring that equal employment opportunity existed.
Recent cases in the school desegregation area offer some support
for an argument that special treatment on the basis of race is constitutionally required to remedy past equal protection violations by government. In those cases, federal courts sought to remedy school board
violations of racial integration orders promulgated under the authority
of Brown v. Board of Education 9 by requiring that certain minimum
numbers of black teachers be assigned to schools in the South where
such teachers had been excluded in the past.9 0 Although these cases
can be distinguished factually from the situation in the construction
industry,91 they do provide at least some constitutional support for
the argument that state and federal governments ought to engage in
88

Id. at 725.
87 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. SUpp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967). See also Kerr v. Enoch Pratt
Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945); Griffin v. State
Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969). Griffin held that any state financing will

subject the organization financed to the limitations of the fourteenth amendment.
88

See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

89 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

90 United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969); United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 940 (1967).
91 For one thing, state responsibility for school segregation in the South has been
much more substantial and direct than federal responsibility for past construction
industry discrimination. Moreover, there is as yet no Supreme Court decision in the
area of discrimination by government contractors to lay a constitutional foundation for
preferential treatment remedial orders in this area.
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special, "color-conscious" treatment toward blacks when they have been
responsible for neglecting their equal protection rights over a long
period of time. As the Second Circuit has pointed out:
[C]lassification by race . .. is something which the Constitution
usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which usually, to our national shame,
has been drawn for the purpose of maintaining racial inequality.
Where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will be
allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment
by race, it will be required.92
The thirteenth amendment, which eliminated slavery, and the
Civil Rights Statutes,93 which were designed to eliminate slavery's
relics, provide a further basis for requiring this kind of preferential
treatment. A federal court has recently held that the section of the
Civil Rights Statutes which assures blacks the right to make contracts 4
proscribes racial discrimination that interferes with their making contracts of employment.9 5 Article II of the Constitution requires the
President to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution"9 6 and to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"; 97 his executive orders
are promulgated under these constitutional powers. 98 In using Article
II authority to disburse federal money in government contract work,
the President is arguably obligated to implement the spirit of the
thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Statutes by rectifying past
job deprivation to blacks. In the Philadelphia Plan, of course, this is
precisely what the President is attempting to accomplish.
B. Implied CongressionalDisapproval
It has been suggested that congressional regulation in the equal
employment area under Tite VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act99 impliedly prevents the executive branch from requiring anything more
92 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)

(footnotes omitted).
93 E.g., REv. STAT. §§ 1977-79 (1875), 42 US.C. §§ 1981-83 (1964). These statutes were
designed to give former slaves the rights to as "full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-

ceedings for the security of person and property as ...

enjoyed by white citizens

...

Id. § 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
94 Id.
95 Central Contractors Ass'n v. Local 46, IBEW, 312 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Wash. 1969).

96 US. CONST. art. II, § 1,
97

d.

8.

Id. § 3.

98 See Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for Government
Contract Work, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 243, 244 (1963).
99 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
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of contractors than Congress required in that statute. 100 This suggestion
is based on the principle that where Congress in comprehensive legislation has declined to grant the President some particular authority,
he exceeds the constitutional limits of his power when he attempts
to exercise that authority by executive order. 101 Therefore, since Congress has dealt comprehensively with equal employment and requires
only racial neutrality of employers, the executive branch cannot on its
own initiative require affirmative action obligations.
In the case of Executive Order No. 11246, however, presidential
authority existed twenty-three years in advance of the congressional
legislation, and its affirmative action language had been given the force
of law before 1964.102 There is no evidence that Congress intended to
modify or limit the Order in Title VII; the entire legislative debate
indicates Congress's intention to leave the President's power unaffected
and unimpaired by the passage of Title VII.103 Further, Title VII's
100 Note, supra note 26, at 596.
101 Id. at 597 & n.SO; cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 843 U.S. 597, 593614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
102 42 Op. AT'ry GEN. No. 21 (1961); 42 CoMP. GEN. 692 (196a); 40 Cor. GEN. 592
(1961). For judicial decisions that have treated the Order, with its affirmative action
obligation, as valid law before and after Title VII was passed, see Farkas v. Texas Instr.,
Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964); Contractor's Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F.
Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St.
2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1004 (1970).
103 Title VII, as originally proposed in the House, contained a specific provision
authorizing the President to "take such action as may be appropriate to prevent unlawful
employment practices by government contractors." H.RL 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 711(b)
(1964). When this proposal was abandoned, the following discussion ensued in the House:

MR. PoFF:
I add further the adoption of this amendment and the striking out of this
language from the bill would in nowise affect substantive law as it is written
on the books today.
MR. CELLAR:

And will the gentleman not also say that the deletion of the language by
amendment does not have any effect upon existing Presidential power?

MR. Por-:
Of course, the striking of language from a bill could not in any way impair
existing law.
MR. CELLAR:
And it does not limit it and it does not broaden it. It remains intact as
it is now.
MR. PoE7:
That is true.
110 CONG. REc. 2575 (1964).
The Clark-Case memorandum, in which two' Senators presented their explanation
of Title VII, stated:
Title VII, in its present form, has no effect on the responsibilities of the con-
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references to the Order indicate that it was to remain operative:
contractors obligated to make reports under the Order are excused
from making similar reports under Title VII.1° 4 Moreover, there is
nothing necessarily inconsistent in allowing both provisions to stand
-a congressional statute requiring nondiscrimination on private projects and an executive order requiring "affirmative action" when the
government is involved through the use of public funds. 10 5
C. The Legality of the Executive Order Under Title VII
An executive order causing contractors to violate a congressional
statute would be unlawful.'0 6 There is some question as to whether
Executive Order No. 11246, as implemented in the Philadelphia Plan,
does this. There are two sections of Title VII which are arguably
violated by the Philadelphia Plan-703(j) and 703(a).
Section 7030) reads in relevant part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin employed by any employer .... 107
The Comptroller General has argued that this section makes the
Philadelphia Plan illegal since it does the very thing the section makes
unlawful-requires preferential treatment to correct a racial imbalance
caused by past discrimination. 0 8 But the introductory language of the
section limits its application to the statute of which it is a part and
makes it inapplicable to other federal laws. Moreover, the entire legismittee or on the authority possessed by the President or Federal agencies under
existing law to deal with racial discrimination in the areas of Federal Government employment and Federal contracts.
Id. at 1715.
104 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(d) (1964). Representatives of the President's Committee administering Executive Order No. 10925 were invited to an information conference concerning the operation of Title VII, Id. § 2000e-15.
105 Both Title VII and the Order as implemented in the Philadelphia Plan have
the force of law. Normal rules of statutory interpretation call for reading two laws
together-in pari materia-so as to make them consistent where possible. See 2 J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5201 (3d. ed. 1943).
The rule is normally used to reconcile two statutes. However, there is good reason
to apply the rule here since Title VII makes specific reference to Executive Order No.
11246.
106 42 Or. ATrY GEN. No. 37, at 6 (1969).
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1964) (emphasis added).
-108 49 Comp. GEN. 59, 66-67 (1969).
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lative history of this section shows that it was proposed by advocates
of Title VII in answer to arguments by Southern Senators that the
Title would require preferential treatment and lead to discrimination
against whites; section 703(j) was designed to make it clear that no
such result was required by Title VII itself. 10 9
Section 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees in any way which
109 The following are illustrative of the statements made by Southern Senators which
led the group supporting the bill to add § 703(j) for purposes of clarification:
Title VII of this bill does not in fact provide for "equality of opportunity,"
but it seeks to establish a preference in employment and a special "right to
employment" based upon "race, religion, color, national origin or sex." This title
seeks to force all employers to give favored consideration and treatment to any
person of a religious or racial minority in order to avoid prosecution and punishment on a charge of "discriminating" against such a person.
110 CONG. R c. 7774 (1964) (remarks of Senator Tower).
The proposal is based on the strange thesis that the best way to grant special
privileges to a particular group of people is to deny the majority of other
Americans those previous rights they already possess. In the name of equal
employment opportunity, title VII seeks to establish a preference and special
right to employment based on "race, color, religion or national origin." When
in full operation, it would seek to force all employers and labor organizations
. . to give preferential treatment to any person of a racial or religious
minority in order to avoid any charge of so-called discrimination against an
applicant or an employee or member.
Id. at 8441 (remarks of Senator Hill).
In response to these charges, Senator Allott of Colorado offered § 703(j) as an
amendment in its initial form on May 4, 1964. Senator Allott introduced his amendment
with the following statement:
Mr. President, I have heard over and over again in the last few weeks
the charge that title VII, the equal employment opportunity section, would
impose a quota system on employers and labor unions. . . . [The argument]
is that an employer will hire members of minority groups, regardless of their
qualifications, to avoid having any problems with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission....
I do not believe title VII would result in ...
a quota system ....
But the argument has been made and I know that employers are . . .
concerned with the argument. I have, therefore, prepared an amendment which
I believe makes it clear that no quota system will be imposed if title VII becomes law. Very briefly, it provides that no finding of unlawful employment
practice may be made solely on the basis of racial imbalance.
Id. at 9881. When the amendment was passed in its final form, the language was changed
slightly to state, as it does at present, that '[niothing contained in this title shall be
interpreted to require ....
." preferential treatment to correct a prior imbalance.
Id. at 12819. Since the legislative history of § 703(j) indicates that the section was intended
only to make it clear that preferential treatment was not required by Title VII itself,
there is no reason to assume that the section limits the Order in any way.
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would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities... because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin."10
The argument of opponents of the Philadelphia Plan has been that
this section makes it illegal to hire on the basis of race and therefore
makes illegal the preferential treatment requirements of the Plan.
During the legislative debate, the Clark-Case memorandum, prepared by the two Senators to explain and defend Title VII, contained
a statement that has been cited in support of this position:
There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance in his work force. On the contrary, any deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance
may be, would involve a violation of title VII because maintaining
such balance would require an employer to hire or refuse to hire
on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that discrimination is
prohibited as to any individual."'
Senator Humphrey made a similar statement:
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title,
there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission
or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees
in order to meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a certain racial
balance.
That bugaboo has been brought up a dozen times; but it is
nonexistent. In fact, the very opposite is true. Title VII prohibits
discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and national
origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing. Title
VII is designed to encourage hiring2 on the basis of ability and
qualifications, not race or religion."1
The statement by Humphrey and the Clark-Case memorandum
should be viewed in their proper context. The Senators were not discussing the permissible scope of Executive Order No. 11246 and did
not have this matter in mind at the time they made their comments.
Many statements in the Congressional Record indicate that Title VII
was to leave the executive's authority unimpaired under the Order. 13
Moreover, the Humphrey and Clark-Case comments were offered by
proponents of the Title and designed to defeat attacks by those opposed
to the Act. The Senators were merely pointing out that Title VII did
not require preferential treatment. In their zeal to defend the statute,
110 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
111 110 CONG. R1c. 7213 (1964).
112 Id. at 6549.
113 See note 103 supra.
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they went on to argue that it would outlaw preferential treatment and
racial hiring altogether. The existing judicial opinions interpreting
Title VII in the context of the Order have not supported this view." 4
In fact, the language of the section does not explicitly make "hiring
on the basis of race" unlawful. Instead, the language prohibits discrimination causing a loss of job opportunity to an individual because
of his race. 1 5 As the Attorney General 1 6 and the court in Contractor's
Association v. Secretary of Labor 1 7 have noted, there is a difference
between preferential hiring and discrimination. The former refers to
giving special consideration to inclusion of the members of one group
whereas the latter concerns deliberate exclusion. There is no theoretical
inconsistency between the two provisions. The Philadelphia Plan requires only a "good faith effort" by contractors to include larger numbers of minorities in construction work. Like Title VII, it also prohibits
discrimination or exclusion on the basis of race. If the contractor could
not reach his percentage of minorities without rejecting white applicants on a racial basis, he would be obligated under the Plan as well
as under Title VII to hire the whites even if this meant a failure to
meet his range. He satisfies his contractual obligation as long as he
makes genuine efforts-short of discrimination against whites-to meet
his goal for inclusion of blacks.
The Comptroller General has argued that any preference to one
race will necessarily and inevitably lead to some exclusion of members
of the other. He insists that the only permissible standard is one of
114 Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
115 It has been argued that the Plan contains "illegal racial quotas." The use of this
emotion-packed phrase is something of a "red herring." The Labor Department states
in a memorandum supporting the Plan that "such characterizations [as quotas], without
definition, do not contribute to a rational discussion of the legal issues." U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Authority Under Executive Order 11246, condensed in 71 BNA LAB. REL. REP.
-NEws
& BACKGROUND INFORAIATION 366 (July 1, 1969). The Department notes that,
according to the dictionary definition, a quota is a "fixed number or percentage of
minority group members." Id. (emphasis in original). The memorandum argues that
the Plan establishes a "goal" rather than a quota since it does not force the contractor
to hire a fixed number of group members but only requires him to make a "good faith
effort" to come within general "ranges." Id. Even more importantly, § 703(a) does not
contain any language forbidding "racial quotas'--it refers only to racial discrimination.
The real issue is not whether the Plan is a quota; it is whether the Plan causes the
kind of racial discrimination against whites that Title VII forbids. Even the Comptroller
General indicates in his opinion that the "quota" discussion diverts attention from the
real problem. 49 CoMP. GEN. 59, 64-65 (1969).
116 42 Op. ATr'y GEM. No. 87, at 6 (1969).
117 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:84

neutrality. 118

pure racial
A problem does arise in regard to what the
Plan will achieve in practice. In order to avoid the difficulties and
problems of proving to compliance officers that they have acted in
"good faith," some contractors may meet their ranges even if required
to discriminate against whites. The Comptroller General argues that
this risk is enough reason to find the Philadelphia Plan unlawful. 119
Several other factors, however, ought to be taken into account.
First, in light of the severe shortages in the construction industry and
because the goals set by the Plan for minority participation do not go
beyond ten percent in each trade for the first year and twenty-five
percent in the final year,120 the problem of a contractor's having to
discriminate against whites to meet his goal should rarely arise. Given
the shortages in construction, there should be ample room for all wellqualified whites and minority applicants to be hired under the Plan.
The minorities in most cases should be serving in additional jobs
rather than replacing white applicants who would otherwise have been
hired. If this does not happen, the fault will be with union unwillingness to open up employment rather than with the Plan itself. Second,
it is unrealistic to view Title VII as requiring pure racial neutrality
in conduct or fact. The pure nondiscrimination called for by the
Comptroller General's opinion is something of a fiction. Those who
have historically discriminated do not suddenly develop attitudes of
racial neutrality to comply with the equal employment laws. Instead,
they probably do what the Southern Senators suggested in the debate
over Title VII-they begin hiring a few blacks to avoid trouble with
the administrators. Such deliberate hiring of blacks should not be
viewed as violative of Title VII.
In reality, human conduct toward the black and white races ranges
across a spectrum with maximum favoritism toward whites and hostility
toward blacks at one end, and maximum favoritism toward blacks and
hostility toward whites at the other.1 1 In the center is an ideal of
racial neutrality. Realistically, Title VII forbids conduct that leans
heavily toward one side or the other, that is hostile to blacks or whites
118 49 CoMe.
119 Id. at 71.

GEN.

59, 69 (1969).

120 U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 41, at 15-16. The percentage requirements apply
only to contractors' federal or federally-assisted construction work. Since the federal
government is involved in less than half of all construction, the percentages for many
contractors' total work forces will be less than half of what is required by the Plan.
Hopefully, contractors will hire blacks for non-federal work in addition to meeting their

ranges on the federal work, but the Plan does not require this.
121 See F. MAIsHAL & V. Baxecs, supra note 4, at 201-03.
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and intended to exclude members of either race from opportunity.
The Philadelphia Plan, however, is designed to bring conduct by construction employers and unions, which in the past has leaned heavily
on the white favoritism, black hostility side, much closer to the ideal
center. It contains no element of hostility toward whites but seeks only
to create greater opportunities for inclusion of blacks in the skilled
building trades. Even under Title VII judges have found it necessary
to issue preferential treatment remedies for past violations of nondiscrimination requirements. 1 22 These remedies are also within the
proper scope of the Title because they are not designed to exclude
whites but rather to bring opportunities in the industry much closer
to a level of equality where there will be less discrimination against
blacks.
D. Contractors' Collective BargainingAgreements
When contractors are unable to meet their ranges through the
union referral halls, the Labor Department has made it clear that they
are expected to disregard the exclusive hiring-hall agreement and go
outside the unions to secure minority workers. 123 It has been argued
that the Philadelphia Plan is unlawful because it will require contractors to violate their collective bargaining agreements. 24 This problem is not as serious as it may appear. Under the law regarding
enforcement of labor agreements, a union's charge of violation should
not be successful.
122 Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051, 1055 (5th
Cir. 1969). The remedial order issued under Title VII in this case required alternating
black and white referrals for work. See also Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212,
292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 282 F. Supp.
39 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). In these cases, judicial orders went beyond proscribing
future discrimination to require the abandonment of existing seniority systems that maintained the effects of past discrimination. The orders established new seniority systems
that would give greater equality in the future to blacks who had been denied opportunity
in the past. Contra, United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968);
United States v, Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 280 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mo. 1968). However,
the latter cases were based on § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964)a section that limits interference with existing seniority systems and has no application
to Executive Order No. 11246.
For a discussion of these cases, see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under
Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. R v. 1598 (1969).
123 "It is no excuse that the union with which the contractor has a collective bargaining agreement failed to refer minority employees." U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note
38, at 10.
124 See 115 CONG. REc. S 16729 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1969) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
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A suit for breach of a collective bargaining agreement is to be
decided on the basis of federal substantive law. In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,' -5 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act

26

gave the courts power to fashion

a body of contract-enforcement law that would be appropriate for collective bargaining relationships and applicable in both state and federal courts. In making decisions under the section, courts are to give
heavy weight to general federal labor law policies. 27
Federal labor policy, as set out in recent decisions under the
National Labor Relations Act, 128 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, and the Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad 29 doctrine, is
clearly opposed to discrimination in employment, particularly when it
is by labor unions. An employer unable to meet his ranges through
a union referral hall would normally be dealing with a union that had
discriminated against minority groups. 30 In such a case, a federal or
state court properly exercising its authority under section 301 should
refuse to enforce the referral-hall agreement. 13 This result is supported
125 353 US. 448 (1957).
126 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 US.C. § 185 (1964).
127 We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 801(a) is
federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor laws. . . . Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state
law.... But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted
to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. . . . Any
state law applied, however, will be absorbed as a federal law and will not be an
independent source of private rights.
353 U.S. at 456-57.
128 It has been held that racial discrimination by unions is an unfair labor practice,
violating the union's duty of fair representation. Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB,
568 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 US. 837 (1967); Metal Workers Local 1,
147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
129 323 U.S. 192 (1944); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 US. 171 (1967). If the union fails to
fairly represent the interests of blacks, the blacks can sue in federal courts to enforce
their right to fair treatment.
130 It is theoretically possible for a contractor to deal with a union that is not
discriminating and still fail to meet his ranges under the Plan. Such a union might
refer workers to him on a nondiscriminatory basis, but not refer enough blacks for the
contractor to satisfy his goals. However, in that special situation, the contractor would
probably be considered in "good faith" even if he refused to go outside the union to
hire more workers. Thus, he would not be forced in such a case to breach his contract.
Moreover, such a situation is not likely to arise because the Plan would not be applied
to trades where the unions were not discriminating. The Labor Department has indicated
that the Plan is designed only for skilled trades in which the unions are guilty of very
serious racial bias.
131 Several recent decisions support this conclusion. E.g., Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268
F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St.
2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1004 (1970). In these cases, the
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by Shelley v. Kraemer 82 which prohibited courts from serving as governmental entities to enforce discriminatory agreements. Similarly,
if an arbitrator held for the union on a contract breach question of
this type, it would be improper for the courts to enforce the result
despite the normal deference paid to arbitrators' decisions. 3 3
It has also been argued that an employer who goes outside a hiringhall agreement is instituting a unilateral change in working conditions
and thus violating his obligation under section 8(a)(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act 3 4 to bargain in good faith with the union concerning such changes. 3 5 This argument does not pose any serious legal
obstacle to the Plan. The Board's concern with section 8(a)(5) violations
for unilateral changes is greatest when they occur before a contract
has been negotiated. At that point, the Board fears that the unilateral
imposition of working terms and conditions by the employer may
prevent a meaningful negotiating relationship from ever being established between the parties. Although the unilateral change doctrine
has been applied to the post-agreement situation, the Board often defers
in such cases to the arbitrators and the courts on the theory that the
changes are primarily contract violations. 30
Even if the Board heard the case, it would not find a violation
of section 8(a)(5) if, in order to meet his obligations under the Philadelphia Plan, the contractor was forced to breach a collective bargaining agreement because the union had been excluding minority groups.
The employer, by hiring outside the hall, would simply be avoiding
the possibility of a derivative violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)137
which would occur if he cooperated with the union's discrimination
scheme. 18 The Board would surely not hold the employer guilty of
employers sought to avoid state and federal executive orders because of their obligations
to discriminating labor unions with whom they had exclusive referral arrangements.
In both cases, the courts disallowed the union agreements as an excuse for failure to
comply with the executive orders.
132 384 U.S. 1 (1948).
133 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 863 U.S. 593 (1960).
134 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
185 NLR.B v. C & C Plywood Corp., 885 U.S. 421 (1967); NLRIB v. Katz, 869 U.S.
786 (1962); C & S Indus., Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
136 Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 481 (1965); International Harvester Co., 138
NL.R.B. 928 (1962).
For an explanation of the standards that the Board applies in deciding whether
to assert jurisdiction over § 8(a)(5) violations in post-contract situations, see Ordman,
Arbitration and the N.LS.RB., in NATiONAL AcADEmy OF ARBIRATORS, PROr-aINos oF THE
TwENT=Ir
ANNUAL MEMrG 47 (1967).
137 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1964).
138 See cases cited in note 60 supra.
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an illegal act for taking unilateral action to avoid committing an unfair
labor practice. If the Board became at all involved in this kind of case,
its concern would be with the union's discrimination. In respect to
the employer's unilateral action, the Board should simply decline to
exercise jurisdiction, leaving the matter to arbitrators and courts with
the likely result that no liability would be found.
CONCLUSION

The Labor Department's decision to require federal construction
contractors to engage in preferential hiring of minorities is justified
by the special obstacles to equal employment opportunity which exist
in the building trades. Under a simple nondiscrimination requirement,
minorities in construction have had no opportunity to break the control that unions maintain over the industry's manpower supply. Although a preferential hiring program under the Philadelphia Plan
raises a number of legal questions, a careful and realistic analysis of
these issues indicates that the Plan is not illegal.
Although this article has been devoted to a discussion of the
general legal and policy issues surrounding the Plan, it would be a
mistake to leave this topic without saying a few words about the issue
of securing compliance with Executive Order No. 11246. Regardless
of how well designed a program may appear conceptually, it will be
futile without effective enforcement. Unfortunately, past enforcement
of the Order has left a great deal to be desired. 189 Already, there are
indications that compliance with the Plan has been inadequate in
Philadelphia, the city of the program's birth. 140
The main problem appears to be the unwillingness of the government to invoke available sanctions. 141 Although some contracts have
been suspended temporarily, there have been no instances in construction in which a contract was terminated and very few in which con139 R. NATHAN, supra note 27, at 141-42.

140 BNA FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAC.-SuMmARY OF LATEsr DEVelopzENTs No. 136,
at 1 (May 7, 1970). The Philadelphia head of the OFCC noted that "compliance was
lagging" and that the number of minorities on the job thus far falls below the number
promised and expected.
141 Far and away the most common complaint of civil rights leaders about the
contract compliance program is the lack of instances in which sanctions and
penalties have been applied against major contractors. Criticism to the effect that
"they have never pulled a contract" or "turned the water off" was widespread
in the field research.
R. NATHAN, supra note 27, at 141.
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tractors were debarred from future federal contracts. 142 Hopefully, at
the same time that a new program is launched, a new effort will be
made to utilize whatever sanctions are necessary to achieve results.
Construction work under the Plan should be carefully scrutinized to
see that contractors are meeting their obligations. When "home-town
solutions" do not deliver on their goals, they should be scrapped and
the Plan applied. Otherwise, the program will *lack "teeth"; contractors
will begin to take their obligations lightly and the bright promise of
the Philadelphia Plan will disappear like other promises and hopes
of the past.
142 No contract has ever been cancelled, terminated or suspended; and there have
been Executive Orders covering contract compliance for many years. Contract
awards have been delayed in Philadelphia and Cleveland. And the Post Office
has passed over two low bidders and blacklisted several contractors. This is the
extent of the sanctions applied during the course of these years. The combination
of reluctance to impose sanctions and the responsiveness of Congress and administrators to pressure from union and contractor groups, destroys the effectiveness
of the contract compliance program and the morale of the staff.
Transcript of Open Meeting Before the Mass. State Advisory Comm. to the U.S. Comm.
on Civil Rights, Contract Compliance and Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Industry 450-51 (1969) (testimony of Paget L. Alves, Jr.).

